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Abstract 
 
The pharmaceutical industry extensively relies on the patent system. It actively lobbies for 
the strengthening of patent protection of its medical products and the results of its efforts 
may be found in the majority of bilateral and multilateral agreements, including the TRIPS 
and the most recent TPPA, augmented by private patent strategies pursued by 
pharmaceutical companies. However, some recent developments show the emerging 
tendency of implementing different business models by pharmaceutical companies that may 
mark the beginning of transformation of this industry. Among these developments is an 
‘open innovation’ model, which has increasingly been followed by some research 
institutions and pharmaceutical companies aiming at facilitating the creation of new and 
affordable medicines, as well as providing transparency in order to enhance safety and 
efficacy of drugs. This article will discuss these two current developments in the 
pharmaceutical industry, i.e. strong IP protection against open innovation.  
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Introduction  
 
Traditionally, intellectual property is seen as a monopoly granted by the state in order to reward the 
creator/inventor and to facilitate dissemination of knowledge that otherwise would be kept secret. Out 
of all types of intellectual property rights, patents are the strongest monopoly one can obtain over the 
results of his intellectual creations. Possession of such a monopoly controls the use of a product 
protected by the patent; most importantly, its price. 
 
A classic example of patent monopoly may be found in the pharmaceutical industry, where the unique 
role of intellectual property is due to the industry’s specific features. On the one hand, pharmaceutical 
companies invest significant financial resources and time into the R&D process, and further 
transformation of the resulted invention into an effective and safe medicine. On the other hand, the 
development and marketing of drugs are under vigilant control of the state. Within this complex 
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environment, the crucial need for strong patent protection, as it is claimed by the industry,1 stems from 
the nature of the product: the development of a successful drug requires substantial time and resources, 
but considerably less time and investments to copy it. Therefore, for the purpose of protection of their 
inventions and prevention of free-riding, pharmaceutical companies extensively rely on the patent 
system.  
 
One of the main arguments for strong patent protection, which is actively articulated by the 
pharmaceutical industry, is the high cost of R&D that amounts to between US$ 800 million2 (Angell, 
2005; Frank, 2003; Light and Warburton, 2001; Morgan et al., 2011; the Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry, 
2009) and US$ 2.6 billions (DiMasi et al., 2015).3  According to the industry figures, as few as 1 in 
5,000 to 10,000 tested compounds are successfully launched (The Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry, para 
161). Some studies go as far as claiming that 60% of the pharmaceutical inventions made between 1981 
and 1983 would not have been developed at all and 65% of those inventions would not have been 
introduced into commerce if patent protection had been unavailable (Mansfield, 1986). 
Hence, it is accepted that the pharmaceutical industry is the IP monopoly oriented industry with the 
need of strong patent protection. It actively lobbies this idea and the results of its efforts may be found 
in the majority of bilateral and multilateral agreements, including the TRIPS and the most recent TPPA.  
 
This is in contrast with other industries that rely on other forms of protection, such as trade secrets4  
(Kulakowski and Chronister, 2006), trade marks, copyrights and design rights. Despite such an 
attractive advantages of the monopoly power provided by the patent, such a business model may not be 
of a great interest to other industries. The software-based industry, for example, has increasingly used 
intellectual property in a different way. Instead of restricting access to their intellectual property, some 
companies open it to their users (e.g. Linux), sometimes on a royalty-free basis, deriving their income 
from a service support and a tailor-made software. These developments have created the antipode of 
the traditional copyright, the so-called ‘copyleft’.  
 
However, some recent developments in the pharmaceutical industry may mark the beginning of the 
transformation of this industry, proving that monopolistic patent strategies may not be the best business 
models after all. Among these developments is an ‘open innovation’ model, which has increasingly 
been followed by some research institutions and pharmaceutical companies aiming at facilitating the 
creation of new and affordable medicines, as well as providing transparency to enhance safety and 
efficacy of drugs. 
 
This article discusses these two current developments in the pharmaceutical industry, i.e. strong IP 
protection against open innovation. It will be explained that pharmaceutical companies can use their 
intellectual property restrictively in order to protect market monopoly of their products. Intellectual 
property can also be used as an open source, facilitating the creation of new medicines through 
providing free access to IP protected information. This article will outline these different models of 
drugs development. It will first discuss the traditional position of the pharmaceutical industry, which is 
aimed at strengthening patent protection by means of international and bilateral instruments, as well as 
private business practices. The article will then turn to the emerging tendency towards implementing 
‘open innovation’ models in the drugs development process with some recent examples of how these 
models are facilitated by international organisations, state authorities, individual initiatives and 
pharmaceutical companies themselves.  
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1. Strengthening of Monopoly Power  
 
1.1. When drugs were not protected by patents 
 
Once upon a time, when drugs were not protected by patents … The modern pharmaceutical industry 
is relatively young and is considered to be an offspring of the dyestuff and chemical industries. The 
establishment of the pharmaceutical industry is closely linked to an incidental discovery made by 
Willian Henry Perkin, a young scientist at the Royal College of Chemistry in London (Greenwood, 
2008, pp. 49-50; Firn, 2010, p.40; Myers, 2003, p. 295). In 1856, he was given a task to synthesise 
quinine from coal-tar, an industrial waste product of gas lighting (Dutfield, 2009, p.11). Although 
unsuccessful in his initial task, he nevertheless discovered the dyeing properties of mauve that 
eventually led to the development of several completely new industries, including the synthetic 
dyestuff, chemical and pharmaceutical industries (p. 12). The dyestuff and chemical industries were 
dominated by German companies such as Bayer, Hoechst, BASF and AGFA, some of which became 
more famous for drugs than dyes (p. 12). Later, companies like Merck, Eli Lilly and Roche, which 
supplied natural products such as morphine, quinine and strychnine, also started a large-scale 
production of drugs (Taylor, 2015). 
 
Despite the importance of this scientific development and the establishment of an entirely new industry, 
patent protection of drugs had not been available in most of the countries until recently. In nineteenth 
century Europe, typically only the process of producing a drug was patentable5 (Boldrin and Levine, 
2005). This meant that, after a drug had been discovered, other companies were free to manufacture 
and sell it using a different process of making it. The pharmaceutical industry, therefore, invested 
considerable time and efforts in order to convert its products from non-patentable subject matter to the 
invention that has arguably the strongest patent protection compared to inventions in other industries. 
 
 
1.2. Further strengthening of pharmaceutical patent protection on the international level: 
TRIPs and TPPA 
 
The signing of the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (the 
TRIPs agreement) in 1994 became a grand victory of the ‘Big Pharma’. Heavily lobbied by the industry, 
this agreement finally set a minimum standard of patent protection on an international level6 (Matthews, 
2002). Article 27 of the TRIPs agreement establishes the rules on patentable subject matter and provides 
that: 
‘… patents shall be available for any inventions, whether products or processes, in all fields of 
technology, provided that they are new, involve an inventive step and are capable of industrial 
application.’ (emphasis added) 
Such a mandatory minimum standard resulted in the protection extended to all inventions, including 
pharmaceuticals. As a result of this international treaty, every signatory Member State undertook an 
obligation to introduce patent protection for drugs in their national legislations, as well as implement 
relevant mechanisms for their registration and enforcement.  
 
Such changes were particularly detrimental to developing countries that could not afford the burden of 
pharmaceutical patents: they had no administrative resources and knowledge in order to implement an 
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adequate examination and registration process, and they were also lacking the necessary financial 
resources to bear the cost of expensive patented medicines. While understanding the challenges of 
developing countries, a few flexibilities were introduced into the TRIPs agreement, such as parallel 
importation, compulsory licensing and the possibility for the Member States to frame their own rules 
on IP exhaustion and patentability requirements.  
 
However, despite the great value of these flexibilities, they are increasingly curtailed by free trade 
agreements signed between developing and developed countries (Dutfield, 2001;  So, 2004; Trade and 
Development Report, 2006, p.195; United Nations High Level Panel on Access to Medicines Report, 
2016; WHO, WIPO, WTO Report, 2013, p.83). These free trade agreements tend to strengthen the IP 
protection of medical products on the bilateral and regional levels. These so-called ‘TRIPs-plus’ 
provisions usually set a higher level of intellectual property protection than is required by TRIPs.7 It is 
believed that such provisions delay generic market entry and lead to higher prices and restricted access 
to medicines in the signatory countries (UNITAID, 2014).  
 
The concerns over access to medicines and excessive pricing are particularly relevant to the Trans-
Pacific Partnership Agreement (the TPPA) signed in 2016.8 It is described as a model agreement for the 
twenty-first century, implying that similar provisions will appear in future trade agreements (Voon, 
2013). This regional agreement substantially elevates the patent protection of medicines comparing to 
the TRIPs agreement standards (Correa, 2015). For instance, the TPPA provides the extension of the 
20 year patent term for pharmaceutical patents as a compensation for ‘unreasonable or unnecessary 
delays’ during marketing authorisation of drugs,9 as well as provides a patent term adjustment for 
‘unreasonable’ delays by the patent office.10 (Matthews, 2015 (a)) 
 
Further, Article 18.37 of the TPPA provides that: 
 
‘Each Party shall make patents available for any invention, whether a product or process, in all 
fields of technology, provided that the invention is new, involves an inventive step, and is capable 
of industrial application.’ 
 
Thus, this provision mirrors Article 27 of TRIPs agreement. However, it goes further adding the 
following section: 
 
‘… each Party confirms that patents are available for inventions claimed as at least one of the 
following: new uses of a known product, new methods of using a known product, or new 
processes of using a known product.’ 
These provisions, therefore, provide pharmaceutical companies with the opportunity to engage in the 
evergreening practices that allow them to extend the protection of a drug beyond the term of a basic 
patent11  (The Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry, 2009, paras 20 and 138).  
 
Moreover, previous version of the TPPA’s Intellectual Property Chapter, proposed by the US and leaked 
in February 2011, contained an additional sentence in this Article, which guaranteed a patent for new 
uses or methods of using a known product: ‘… even if such invention does not result in the enhancement 
of the known efficacy of that product’ (emphasis added)12 (Love, 2014). Although this phrase was 
deleted in the subsequent version of the Chapter, it shows the unprecedented level of protection lobbied 
by the US for its pharmaceutical corporations.13 Despite the withdrawal of the US from the TPPA, the 
discussions of its ratification by the remaining members continue.14 Therefore, such a favourable 
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provisions towards the pharmaceutical industry is likely to have a significant effect on access to 
medicines should this agreement come into force.  
 
As can be seen from the above discussion, the level of intellectual property protection gained by the 
pharmaceutical industry by means of introducing the patent protection for drugs into national laws, free 
trade agreements and international treaties has substantially increased during the last few decades. Such 
development has led to the strengthening of market power by pharmaceutical companies and increased 
the entry barriers for competitors. 
 
 
1.3. Further strengthening of patent protection by business strategies 
 
Strengthening of international and national intellectual property laws, which enable pharmaceutical 
companies to increase protection of their products and enhance their market power, is not the only tool 
in the arsenal of the pharmaceutical industry. Individual business strategies of pharmaceutical 
companies may also be very effective, which, when used together with the strong IP protection and 
other regulatory rules, may substantially extend market exclusivity of a drug beyond the terms and 
scope of initial patent protection. Such a dual strategic approach to the protection of drugs can 
substantially delay or even block generic competition, as well as stifle the development and introduction 
of innovative drugs. 
The particular interest to such individual practices in the EU was raised by the AstraZeneca case, when, 
in 2005, the company was found by the EU Commission to abuse its dominant position.15 In this case, 
the originator company AstraZeneca was accused of two abuses. The first concerned the abuse of the 
patent system by providing misleading information to the patent office and obtaining a supplementary 
protection certificate that led to the unlawful extension of the patent protection of the company’s product 
Losec (omeprazole). The second abuse related to the misuse of marketing authorisation procedures. The 
company employed several strategies in order to deter a generic version of its product from entering the 
market when its patent for the original product Losec was about to expire. Due to the success of this 
strategy, the company was able to keep generics off the market in some countries. In 2005, AstraZeneca 
was fined EUR 60 million by the EU Commission. In 2010, the General Court upheld the Commission’s 
decision.16  
The EU Commission, concerned about the anticompetitive practices of pharmaceutical companies, as 
well as the evident market failure, launched an inquiry into the pharmaceutical industry. In 2009, after 
its in-depth investigation, the Commission released a report, which outlines several practices of 
pharmaceutical companies that are likely to cause delays of both generic and innovative competition 
(The Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry, 2009). The Commission found that brand-name pharmaceutical 
companies protect their market share by employing a tool-box of practices, which enable them to block 
generic competition and deter innovative competitors.17 These practices include inter alia patent 
thickets18 (Gurgula, 2017), life-cycle strategies for follow-on products (Bansal et al., 2009; Granstrand 
and Tietze, 2015; Hemphill  and Sampat, 2012), defensive patenting (The Pharmaceutical Sector 
Inquiry, para 1117) and patent settlement agreements19 (Federal Trade Commission Staff Study, 2010).  
 
Despite the Commission referring to these strategies as a reason for the delays of generic entry, they 
have not become the focus of its attention. For instance, practices such as patent settlement agreements, 
while heavily litigated by the US FTC for more than a decade, have only recently raised the interest of 
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the EU Commission. Moreover, strategic patenting, although being claimed in the Commission’s 
Report as a reason for the delay of generic competition, has not been investigated by the competition 
authorities at all. The lack of control of these particular practices by the competition authorities results 
in the (ab)use of the patent system by pharmaceutical companies for the detriment of consumers leading 
to excessive prices and restricted access to medicines (Matthews and Gurgula, 2016(b)). 
 
 
 
2. Open access to IP in the pharmaceutical industry  
 
As the FTC acknowledged in its seminal 2003 Report: ‘[e]ver greater intellectual property protection is 
not necessarily socially beneficial’ (The FTC Report, 2003). Hence, on the other side of the IP fence 
erected by the pharmaceutical industry, there is a growing understanding of the importance of open 
innovation and open access for the benefit of society. The changes in the way the drug development 
process is perceived have occurred as a result of, among other things, a significant decrease in the 
development and approval of innovative drugs on the one hand; and a lack of transparency and restricted 
access to the data, which has raised considerable concerns about the safety and efficacy of medicines, 
on the other hand. ‘Open innovation’ or ‘open science’ is an emerging trend in drugs development, the 
most important features of which are that ‘all data and ideas are freely shared, anyone may participate 
and there are no patents’ (Robertson et al, 2014; Shaw, 2017; Wells, 2016). The benefits of this 
approach compared to the traditional models of the drugs development process is its speed, access to a 
wide network of experts, disclosure of both positive and negative data and a reduction in unnecessary 
duplication of research worldwide (Robertson et al, 2014). Open science in the pharmaceutical industry 
mimics the open source movement in software development acknowledging its significant 
achievements (ibid). 
 
At present, such changes are mainly driven by academics, NGOs and public research institutions. 
However, a number of pharmaceutical companies have also shown some interest in these new business 
models of drugs development moving towards collaboration and open access. By way of example, this 
section will outline several initiatives pursued by public and private organisations in the recent years 
aiming at achieving transparency and open innovation in the pharmaceutical industry.   
 
     
2.1. Initiatives on the international level 
 
In September 2016, after completing the extensive discussion and reviewing numerous submissions 
from various stakeholders, the UN High-Level Panel on Access to Medicines released its Report on 
‘Promoting innovation and access to health technologies’(Matthews and Gurgula, 2016(a); United 
Nations High Level Panel on Access to Medicines Report, 2016). The aim of this UN initiative was to 
‘review and assess proposals and recommend solutions for remedying the policy incoherence between 
the justifiable rights of inventors, international human rights law, trade rules and public health in the 
context of health technologies’(United Nations High Level Panel on Access to Medicines Report, 2016,  
p. 7). The UN High-Level Panel recommended, among other things, that the results of the publicly-
funded research should be made freely and widely available (p. 9), that the data on all completed and 
discontinued clinical trials should be made publically available (p. 11), and that patent information on 
medicines and vaccines should be made available through publicly accessible databases (ibid).   
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This initiative was upheld by eleven major funders of medical research and international non-
governmental organisations, including the UK Medical Research Council, Médecins Sans Frontières, 
the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, and the Wellcome Trust.20 On 18 May 2017, these organisations 
signed a joint statement agreeing on ‘new standards that will require all clinical trials they fund or 
support to be registered and the results disclosed publicly’(Joint statement, 2017). Such an initiative 
was a result of the concerns that about 50 per cent of clinical trials are unreported, often because their 
results are negative (WHO Press Release, 2017). Such ‘unreported trial results leave an incomplete and 
potentially misleading picture of the risks and benefits of vaccines, drugs and medical devices, and can 
lead to use of suboptimal or even harmful products’(ibid).   
 
The WHO also actively discusses the alternative incentives for innovation in health products, in 
particular how to incentivise more R&D in order to meet global health needs with the focus on the 
importance to delink ‘the costs of R&D from the price of the end product’, as well as to facilitate ‘open 
knowledge innovation’(WHO Report, 2012). In 2016, the WHO launched a global health research and 
development observatory21 in order to monitor and analyse relevant information on health research and 
development, the function of which will include the integration of available information on funding for 
health research and development, health products in the pipeline, clinical trials and research 
publications, etc (ibid).   
 
In 2011, WIPO, in collaboration with BIO Ventures for Global Health (BVGH), and with the 
participation of a number of pharmaceutical companies and other private and public sector research 
organisations, established the WIPO Re:Search, a database in which public and private sector 
organisations share their intellectual property and expertise with the global health research community. 
The aim of this initiative is to promote the development of new drugs, vaccines and diagnostics in the 
fight against neglected tropical diseases, malaria and tuberculosis by means of granting access to 
intellectual property, including pharmaceutical compounds, technologies, know-how and other data for 
further research and development.22 
 
Open access initiatives are also taken by the EU, which is also determined to examine alternative 
mechanisms in order to enhance access to medicines (Oxfam Briefing Paper, 2014). Thus, under 
Horizon 2020 (the EU’s €80bn research and innovation funding programme adopted in 2013), some 
important developments have been undertaken, including mandating open-access publishing, 
facilitating the dissemination of research results and encouraging the use of prizes.23 Another EU 
initiative under Horizon 2020 is the Innovative Medicines Initiative (IMI) that is aimed at facilitating 
R&D through a public-private partnership with the European Federation of Pharmaceutical Industries 
and Associations (EFPIA), to enhance knowledge sharing and create tools and methods that will 
facilitate the development of better medicines (IMI; Europe 2020 Flagship Initiative, 2010). 
 
 
2.2. Public initiatives on ‘missing data’ 
As was discussed above, there is a considerable concern about the bias in pharmaceutical trial literature 
(Angell, 2005; Jones et al., 2013; Risin et al., 2008; Turner et al. 2008), in particular regarding ‘missing 
data’ in pharmaceutical research24 (Dziura et al., 2013; Goldacre, 2013; Molenberghs and Kenward, 
2007). It is claimed that a large proportion of evidence from human trials is unreported, and much of 
what is reported is done inadequately.25 The unpublished trials are the trials that show the pharma 
companies' new products in unfavourable lights and may contain evidence that the new drugs are not 
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as effective as being claimed, are not effective at all, or are harmful. The fact that pharmaceutical 
companies withheld such data undermines the confidence in the safety and efficacy of medicines that 
are prescribed by doctors as many of the drugs have been promoted as safer and more effective than 
they really are. This endangers people's lives and wastes public funds.  
A few initiatives tackling this problem have been launched recently. One is launched by AllTrials26 and 
requires that ‘all trials past and present should be registered, and the full methods and the results 
reported’.27 Also, in 2013, The BMJ28 announced that it will no longer publish any trial where the 
authors do not commit to making the relevant anonymised patient level data available, on reasonable 
request. Moreover, the journal published a number of The BMJ's coverage of adverse outcomes 
associated with hidden clinical trial data. For instance, in 2014, BMJ Open published the first RIAT 
(Restoring invisible and abandoned trials) paper on an abandoned randomised controlled trial that 
remained unpublished for 20 years, and their reanalysis casts doubt regarding the survival benefit of 
further surgery after curative resection of colorectal cancer.29 Another independent investigation was 
done with respect to Study 329, the infamous trial of paroxetine (Paxil, Seroxat) that was claimed to 
show that the drug was well tolerated and effective in the treatment of major depression in adolescents 
(Noury et al., 2015). Study 329 was subsequently dubbed by the US Food and Drug Administration a 
‘failed trial’, as neither treatment was found to be better than placebo (The BMJ, Open Data Campaign). 
The examination showed that the paper was not prepared by the authors claimed in it, but by a writer 
paid by the manufacturer (ibid).  However, the disturbing fact was that reports emerged of serious 
adverse effects of paroxetine in adolescents, including self-harm and suicidal ideation (ibid). In 2012, 
the US Department of Justice investigated a failure to report safety data and other misconduct by GSK, 
and commenced criminal and civil proceedings with a record $3bn fine (ibid). 
 
 
2.3. State initiatives  
 
The problem of unpublished data is exacerbated by the fact that even those clinical trial documents that 
are submitted to the marketing authorisation bodies are not available to the public. Most of the countries, 
including the US, consider clinical trial reports and other parts of the dossier submitted by 
pharmaceutical companies as commercial confidential information and, therefore, not releasable. 
However, the European Medicines Agency (EMA) is the only regulator that has started to give access 
to clinical trial data (Doshi and Jefferson, 2016).  
 
Thus, in October 2014, after a considerable discussion among stakeholders, the EMA published its new 
policy: Publication of Clinical Data for Medicinal Products for Human Use, which came into force on 
1 January 2015 (EMA, 2014). It allows the EMA to proactively publish clinical data. The main 
objectives of the new policy are, by making clinical data available proactively, to enable public scrutiny 
and application of new knowledge in future research in the interest of public health (ibid). As a result 
of these developments, the current approach of the EMA to transparency covers both the reactive (upon 
the request from third parties) and proactive release of clinical data (proactive release of clinical study 
result summaries on the EU Clinical Trials Register) (Cameron et al., 2014; GIPC Report, 2015; 
Matthews, 2015(b)). 
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2.4. Initiatives of the pharmaceutical industry   
 
Understanding the value of collaboration with other experts in the field, pharmaceutical companies have 
started to implement new models of drugs development more actively in the recent years. Such new 
models are implemented through collaboration with public research institutions and other originators. 
This collaboration may diverge in terms of IP related aspects, spanning from the traditional IP protection 
of the research results to open innovation with no IP protection at all and free open access to the 
generated data. The latter model of open innovation, the so-called ‘precompetitive collaboration’, has 
proven to be successful in the early stages of R&D (United Nations High Level Panel on Access to 
Medicines Report, 2016, p. 27). Such collaboration helps to enhance the research in new fields of 
science and expand the knowledge for all, facilitating the progress in development of innovative 
medicines in a shorter period of time (ibid).  While such business practices of pharmaceutical companies 
were perceived as an exception in the past, they are increasingly becoming an emerging tendency, rather 
than an isolated practice.  
A well-known example of private-public collaboration is Medicines for Malaria Venture (MMV) that 
was established in 1999 with the financial support of the Rockefeller Foundation, Gates Foundation, 
and three European governments30 (Gabriel et al., 2017, p. 31). Its goal is to ‘reduce the burden of 
malaria in disease-endemic countries by discovering, developing and delivering new, effective and 
affordable antimalarial drugs’.31 The intellectual property over the results of the research belongs to 
Novartis, which has obliged to distribute medicines at affordable price to the public sector in countries 
where malaria is endemic (Gabriel et al., 2017, p. 31). MMV has also initiated open source research in 
drug discovery for malaria and neglected diseases, including the Pathogen Box, which contains 400 
diverse, drug-like molecules active against neglected diseases available free of charge.32 Further, the 
most recent example of private collaboration is the 2016 agreement between GSK and Google's parent 
company Alphabet on collaboration aiming at the development of bioelectronic medicines - miniature 
electronic implants for the treatment of chronic disease such as asthma, diabetes, arthritis and other 
conditions (GSK Press Release, 2016). 
A gradual shift towards open access research can be seen in a launch of partnerships with public 
institutions by a number of pharmaceutical companies. These partnerships make freely available all 
information generated as a result of such joint collaboration. Such free and open access is anticipated to 
facilitate further research on the basis of the released information. An example of a partnership, on the 
basis of the open innovation model in the pharmaceutical industry, is the Structural Genomics 
Consortium (SGC),33 the members of which are Abbvie, Bayer, Boehringer Ingelheim, Canada 
Foundation for Innovation, the São Paulo Research Foundation, Genome Canada, Janssen, Merck, 
Novartis, The Ontario Ministry of Research and Innovation, Pfizer, Takeda, and The Wellcome Trust.34 
Although the SGC receives funding mainly from private pharmaceutical companies, it has undertaken 
to release and make freely available all generated output to the public (Pearson, 2012). There are also 
several individual proposals to share clinical trial data at patient level, including the GlaxoSmithKline 
Data Transparency Initiative and Roche Global Policy on Sharing of Clinical Trial Data. According to 
these proposals, researchers may receive access to patient-level data after requests have been reviewed 
by an independent panel of experts.35 
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2.5. Public initiatives  
 
Perhaps one of the most important and active elements that guard public interest are various public 
initiatives, such as non-governmental organisations, patients groups and individuals, which are 
vigorously fighting against abuses of pharmaceutical companies and for transparency and the enhanced 
access to effective and affordable medicines. Numerous examples of such public pressure have forced 
pharmaceutical companies to provide licences (sometimes even on a royalty-free basis) to generic 
companies on their medicines, or to decrease prohibitive prices to affordable.  
One of the examples of a successful public pressure relates to Gilead's innovative drug Sovaldi 
(sofosbuvir) that is used in the treatment of HCV (Hepatitis C). This new generation of medicines offers 
more efficiency, with many boasting sustained virologic response (SVR) in more than 90% of patients 
and fewer side effects than previous treatment options. It was included in the 2015 Model List of 
Essential Medicines (Mezher, 2015).  However, the company has set a prohibitive price for the drug of 
$1,000 per pill, or $84,000 for a 12-week treatment. In the first quarter of 2014, the company sold 
$2.27bn of Sovaldi. (Hoofnagle and Sherker, 2014; Associated Press, 2014; Hensley, 2014) 
As 75 percent of the estimated 150 to 180 million people infected with Hepatitis C live in LMICs, this 
means that they cannot afford this essential medicine (Douste-Blazy, 2014; Knox, 2014; The Lancet, 
2014). This triggered outcry and debate throughout the world from patient advocacy groups, which 
demanded that Gilead lower the price for Sovaldi and criticised the company for its licensing practices 
(Oxfam Briefing Paper, 2014). As a result, Gileard has entered into licensing agreements with several 
generics manufacturers in India (ibid). 
Some activists, like James Love, argue that the best solution against the abuses of pharmaceutical 
companies are to forfeit the patent protection on medicines, and that public health would be better served 
by systems where essential public health research is publicly funded, monopoly protections of IP are 
suspended, and information is freely exchanged as in the open source software movement (Love, 2004). 
As an alternative, he refers to the Medical Innovation Prize Fund, a legislation proposed in the US 
Congress, which would allocate part of the US government's budget to pay substantial cash rewards to 
researchers who create innovative drugs or vaccines, but remove the monopoly protections of IP. He 
says that this will divorce the market for the product from the market for innovation. 36 
 
 
Conclusions  
 
Starting from its establishment in the nineteenth century, the modern pharmaceutical industry has gone 
through several stages of development. It began with a minimum level of protection afforded by 
intellectual property and has culminated into the international and bilateral treaties with the highest 
level of IP protection that hardly any inventions receive nowadays. Such a protection is supplemented 
by private business strategies of pharmaceutical companies, the most effective of which are the active 
use of the patent system and regulatory rules. Moreover, although these strategies may be abusive, 
competition authorities are reluctant to act fearing that this may affect incentives to innovate.   
 
Strong proprietary position of the pharmaceutical industry, achieved as a result of changes in the law, 
as well as aggressive IP strategies by pharmaceutical companies, often lead to prohibitively high prices 
of drugs, making them unaffordable not only to the patients in developing countries, but also in 
developed countries. As a result, some authors believe that the pharmaceutical industry has forgotten 
Monopoly v. Openness in the Pharma Sector                                                            Olga Gurgula 
 
11 
 
its initial objective of creating new and innovative medicines to cure diseases and safe lives (Angell, 
2005). Instead, it has become a mega business, or as it is now called, the ‘Big Pharma’, with the sole 
purpose of reaping the yield and increasing it further.  
 
It is, nevertheless, apparent that the global scene in which the pharmaceutical industry operates is 
changing again. The open access initiatives from various stakeholders are now framing the new reality 
in the pharmaceutical industry. Companies have to adapt their business strategies to this new reality. 
Some of them shift to the open access model, sharing their proprietary information with the public 
institutions or collaborating with other pharmaceutical companies. Of those, some are genuinely driven 
by willingness to combat poverty, facilitate creation of new orphan drugs, and enhance access to 
affordable medicines.  Others either are forced to adapt, or are acting voluntarily with the understanding 
that it is the only way to survive. Although it is too soon to salute the defeat of the patent monopoly 
dominance, there are clear signs that the ice has cracked and there will be no way back.  
 
To conclude, the pharmaceutical industry is experiencing today a major tension between two powerful 
interests - private business interest that strives for IP monopoly in order to protect its revenues, and 
public interest that advocates for open access in order to facilitate access to medicines. Although it is 
hard to predict which of these interests will prevail, it is, however, clear that the pharmaceutical industry 
has to adapt to the current realities and business models, including clinical data transparency, joint 
collaboration and constant public pressure. 
 
 
Notes  
 
1. See, however, Angell, A. (2005) The Truth About the Drug Companies. How they Deceive Us and What to Do About It. 
Random House Trade, 37; Ouellette, L.L. (2010) ‘How Many Patents Does It Take to Make a Drug - Follow-On 
Pharmaceutical Patents and University Licensing’, Mich. Telecomm. & Tech. L. Rev., 17, 299                                                                                                                
Available at <http://repository.law.umich.edu/mttlr/vol17/iss1/7> [Accessed on May 2017]. 
2. However, this cost is subject to a heated debate. See e.g., Angell, A. (2005) The Truth About the Drug Companies. How 
they Deceive Us and What to Do About It. Random House Trade 37; Frank, R.G. (2003) ‘New Estimates of Drug 
Development Costs’,J. HEALTH EcoN., 22, 325, 325 (stating that the $802 million estimates ‘have been a matter of heated 
debate since they were first made public in 2001’); Light, D.W. and Warburton, R (2011) ‘Demythologizing the high costs 
of pharmaceutical research’ BioSocieties, 6(1),  34–50; Morgan, S., Grootendorst, P., Lexchin, J., Cunningham, C., and 
Greyson, D. (2011)  ‘The cost of drug development: A systematic review’, Health Policy, 100, 4–17. 
3. A recent Tufts Center for the Study of Drug Development (CSDD) estimated that costs could reach $2.6 billion. See 
DiMasi, J. A., Grabowski, H. G. and Hansen, R. W., (2015)  ‘The Cost of Drug Development’ New England Journal of 
Medicine 372, 1972-1972, doi:doi:10.1056/NEJMc1504317. 
4. The most famous trade secret is the Coca-Cola Company’s formula for making its nearly 100-year old product Coca-Cola. 
See Kulakowski, E.C., and Chronister, L.U. (2006) Research Administration and Management. Jones and Bartlet 
Publishers, 856. 
5. Boldrin, M. and Levine, D.K. (2005) Economic and Game Theory. Against Intellectual Monopoly. Available at 
<http://levine.sscnet.ucla.edu/general/intellectual/against.htm> [Accessed on May 2017]. The authors explain that, for 
example, French law of 1844 forbade patents on pharmaceutical inventions, with subsequent permission of process patents; 
limited patents on drugs from 1966; and eventual withdrawal of the ban in 1978. In Germany, pharmaceutical process 
patents were allowed under the law of 1877 with the prohibition of product patents.  However, in 1891, patent protection 
was extended to products obtained through the patented process, and starting from 1967, pharmaceutical product patents 
were also allowed. In Switzerland, patents on pharmaceutical products were prohibited by constitution. Limited protection 
for process patents was introduced in 1907 due to the constant pressure from German pharmaceutical companies, while 
product patents were allowed as recently as 1977. In Italy, after the pressure of foreign pharmaceutical companies, product 
patents were introduced in 1978. In Spain, product patents for pharmaceuticals were prohibited under the law of 1931 and 
only after the country joined the EEC, starting from 1992, drugs became patentable.  In the United States, by contrast, 
drugs have always been patentable both in the form of a process and product as they were considered to be chemical 
products.  
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6. For the details on the negotiation preceding the conclusion of the TRIPs agreement see Matthews, D. (2002) Globalising 
Intellectual Property. The TRIPs Agreement. Routledge. 
7. For example, the US-Korea Free Trade Agreement establishes prohibition on pre-grant patent opposition (Article 18.8.4) 
and allows patents for new uses or methods of using a known product (Article 18.8(1)). The US-Australia Free Trade 
Agreement also allows patents for new uses or methods of using a known product (Article 17.9(1)), establishes data 
exclusivity periods (Article 17.(10)(1)), patent term extensions for ‘unreasonable’ regulatory or marketing delays (Article 
17(9)(8)) and restrictions on compulsory licensing (Article 17(9)(4)).   
8. The IP Chapter on the TPPA is available at <https://www.mfat.govt.nz/assets/_securedfiles/Trans-Pacific-
Partnership/Text/18.-Intellectual-Property.pdf> [Accessed on May 2017]. 
9. Article 18.48 of the TPPA ‘Patent Term Adjustment for Unreasonable Curtailment’. 
10. Article 18.46 of the TPPA: Patent Term Adjustment for Patent Office Delays. Section 4 of this article explains that ‘for 
the purposes of this Article, an unreasonable delay at least shall include a delay in the issuance of a patent of more than 
five years from the date of filing of the application in the territory of the Party, or three years after a request for examination 
of the application has been made, whichever is later.’ 
11. According to the pharmaceutical industry jargon, acknowledged by the EU Commission in its Pharmaceutical Sector 
Inquiry Report, 2009, paras 20 and 138, a basic patent protects an active compound of the drug, while secondary patents 
protect various features of a drug, such as formulation and method of production.  
12. For the discussion of the previous versions of the TPPA’s IP Chapter see Love, J (2014) ‘New leak of TPP consolidated 
text on intellectual property provides details of pandering to drug companies and publishers’ Available at 
<http://www.keionline.org/node/2108> [Accessed on May 2017]. 
13. The complete text of the US proposal for the TPPA’s  IP Chapter (10 February 2011) is available at 
<http://keionline.org/node/1091>. 
14. Press Release (2017) ‘The United States Officially Withdraws from the Trans-Pacific Partnership’ Available at < 
https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2017/january/US-Withdraws-From-TPP> [Accessed 
on May 2017]. 
15. Case T-321/05 AstraZeneca AB v Commission [2010] ECR II-2805. 
16. The Court decreased the fine from 60 to 52.5 million euros. The appeal against that decision by AstraZeneca was rejected 
by the European Court of Justice in 2012. 
17. According to the Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry Report (2009) other practices that may delay competition to the patent-
related exchanges and litigation, oppositions and appeals, interventions before marketing authorisation and/or pricing and 
reimbursement bodies.  
18. For the critic of the Commission’s approach to patent thickets in the pharmaceutical industry see Gurgula, O. (2017) 
‘Strategic Accumulation of Patents in the Pharmaceutical Industry and Patent Thickets in Complex Technologies — Two 
Different Concepts Sharing Similar Features’. IIC doi:10.1007/s40319-017-0551-8. 
19. Case T-472/13 Lundbeck v Commission; Case AT.39612 - Perindopril (Servier) (2014); FTC v Actavis, Inc., 570 US 
__(2013), slip op. See also the FTC Press Release (2015) ‘FTC Settlement of Cephalon Pay for Delay Case Ensures $1.2 
Billion in Ill-Gotten Gains Relinquished; Refunds Will Go To Purchasers Affected By Anticompetitive Available at 
<https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2015/05/ftc-settlement-cephalon-pay-delay-case-ensures-12-billion-ill> 
[Accessed on October 2016]; Federal Trade Commission Staff Study (2003) ‘Pay-for-Delay: How Drug Company Pay-
Offs Cost Consumers Billions’. p. 3 Available at <http://www.ftc.gov/os/2010/01/100112 payfordelayrpt.pdf> [Accessed 
on October 2016]. 
20. These includes the Indian Council of Medical Research, the Norwegian Research Council, the UK Medical Research 
Council, Médecins Sans Frontières and Epicentre (its research arm), PATH, the Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness 
Innovations (CEPI), Institut Pasteur, the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, and the Wellcome Trust. 
21. The observatory was established according to the Resolution WHA66.22 adopted by the Sixty-sixth World Health 
Assembly adopted (May, 2013). 
22. WIPO Re:Search, available at <http://www.wipo.int/cooperation/en/multi_stakeholder_platforms/> [Accessed on  
October 2016]. 
23. The H2020 and FP7 reference documents page available at 
<http://ec.europa.eu/research/participants/portal/desktop/en/funding/reference_docs.html#h2020-legal-basis-fp> 
[Accessed on October 2016]. 
24. Goldacre, B. (2013) Bad Pharma: How Medicine is Broken, and How We Can Fix It. Fourth Estate (arguing that about 
half of the clinical trials undertaken by the pharmaceutical industry are never published). 
25. As reported by the BMJ (formerly the British Medical Journal) available at http://www.bmj.com/content/344/bmj.d8158 
[Accessed on October 2016]. 
26. AllTrials is an international initiative of Ben Goldacre (author of Bad Science and Bad Pharma), the BMJ, Centre for 
Evidence-based Medicine, Cochrane Collaboration, James Lind Initiative, PLOS and Sense About Science and is being 
led in the US by Sense About Science USA, Dartmouth’s Geisel School of Medicine and the Dartmouth Institute for Health 
Policy & Clinical Practice. The AllTrials petition has been signed by 88741 people and 682 organisations (as of 
September 2016). 
27. See <http://www.alltrials.net/find-out-more/all-trials/> [Accessed on October 2016].  
28. The BMJ is a weekly peer-reviewed medical journal. It is one of the world's oldest and influential general medical journals. 
Originally called the British Medical Journal. 
29. See <http://www.bmj.com/open-data> [Accessed on October 2016]. 
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30. For more details see <https://www.mmv.org/> [Accessed on May 2017]; see also Gabriel, M., Stanley, I. and Saunders, T. 
(2017) ‘Open innovation in health: A guide to transforming healthcare through collaboration’ 31 Available at < 
http://www.nesta.org.uk/publications/open-innovation-health-guide-transforming-healthcare-through-collaboration> 
[Accessed on May 2017]. 
31. See ‘MMV Boilerplate 2017’, available at <https://www.mmv.org/newsroom/boilerplate> [Accessed on May 2017]. 
32. See ‘The Pathogen Box’, available at <https://www.mmv.org/research-development/open-source-research> [Accessed on 
May 2017]. 
33. The SGC website states that the SGC (Structural Genomics Consortium) is a not-for-profit, public-private partnership with 
the directive to carry out basic science of relevance to drug discovery. The core mandate of the SGC is to determine 3D 
structures on a large scale and cost-effectively - targeting human proteins of biomedical importance and proteins from 
human parasites that represent potential drug targets. In these two areas respectively, the SGC is now responsible for >25% 
and >50% of all structures deposited into the Protein Data Bank each year; by September 2011 the SGC had released the 
structures of over 1200 proteins with implications to the development of new therapies for cancer, diabetes, obesity, and 
psychiatric disorders. Available at < http://www.thesgc.org/about/mini_faq#faq_1>[Accessed on May 2017]. 
34. See <http://www.thesgc.org/about/partners> [Accessed on October 2016]. 
35. In 2013, a joint statement was issued by EFPIA and PhRMA on ‘Principles for Responsible Clinical Trial Data Sharing’. 
Available at <http://www.phrma.org/press-release/joint-efpia-phrma-principles-for-responsible-clinical-trial-data-
sharing-become-effective-today> [Accessed on October 2016]. 
36. See <http://www.iavireport.org/Back-Issues/Pages/IAVI-Report-9%285%29-inventionsinnovatethyself.aspx> [Accessed 
on May 2016]. 
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